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31. introduction
In most cases a Condorcet winner, i.e. an alternative more preferable for 
the majority of actors than any other alternative, does not exist and a core 
(a set of all alternatives undominated in majority relation) is empty. Therefore 
various sets of alternatives were proposed as solution concepts for majority 
voting games and/or as social choice rules. Below several such concepts are 
considered and compared: dominant set (Ward, 1961; Smith, 1973), minimal 
dominant set (Fishburn, 1977; Miller, 1977), undominated set (Ward, 1961), 
minimal undominated set (Schwartz, 1970, 1972), weakly stable and mini-
mal weakly stable sets (Aleskerov, Kurbanov, 1999), uncovered set (Fishburn, 
1977; Miller, 1980), uncaptured and untrapped sets (Duggan, 2007). In ad-
dition we introduce a new solution concept — k-stable sets of alternatives — 
and analyze its relations with other solution concepts listed above.
The structure of the article is as follows. In Section 2 the definitions of 
sets are given and their relationships are explored. In addition, a criterion 
to determine whether an alternative belongs to a minimal weakly stable set 
is established. It is shown that for tournaments an uncovered set is always a 
subset of a union of minimal weakly stable sets. It is also demonstrated that a 
hierarchy of dominant sets defines a “macrostructure” of majority relation.
In Section 3 the concept of stability is employed to generalize the notions 
of weakly stable and uncovered sets. The concepts of k-stable alternatives and 
sets are introduced and their properties and mutual relations are explored. 
In Section 4 the results are summarized and interpreted. Table 2 and 
Table 3 summarize the relations between all sets discussed in the paper for 
general case and for tournaments respectively. It is also shown that the hi-
erarchies of the classes of k-stable alternatives and k-stable sets combined 
with the system of dominant sets constitute a tournament structure based on 
different degrees of stability. Appendix 1 provides Examples and proofs of 
some propositions from the previous Sections. An algorithm for calculating 
the minimal dominant sets and the classes of k-stable alternatives is given in 
Appendix 2. Almost all proofs of Lemmas and Theorems and an auxiliary 
Lemma 7 are put in Appendix 3.
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Ключевой проблемой моделирования коллективного выбора является то, что победитель Кон-
дорсе, т.е. альтернатива более предпочтительная для коллектива, чем любая другая альтернатива при 
парном сравнении, в общем случае отсутствует. Поэтому с конца 70-х гг. прошлого века предприни-
мались попытки локализовать результат выбора в некотором всегда непустом подмножестве множе-
ства альтернатив, на котором определено отношение мажоритарного доминирования, играющее роль 
системы коллективных предпочтений.
Предметом данной работы является сравнительный анализ основных концепций,  старых и но-
вых, предлагавшихся в качестве решений задачи коллективного выбора. Сравниваются двенадцать 
множеств, построенных с помощью отношения мажоритарного доминирования: ядро, пять версий 
непокрытого множества, две версии минимального слабоустойчивого множества, незахваченное 
множество, незапертое множество, минимальное недоминируемое множество и минимальное доми-
нирующее множество. 
Основные результаты исследования, излагающиеся в работе, таковы. 
I. Локализовано определение минимального слабоустойчивого множества, то есть сформули-
рован критерий, определяющий принадлежность альтернативы объединению минимальных слабо-
устойчивых множеств. С помощью этого критерия выявлена связь объединения минимальных сла-
боустойчивых множеств с отношением покрытия и с непокрытым множеством.
II. Для всех рассматриваемых множеств установлено наличие или отсутствие отношения вклю-
чения как в общем случае, так и для такого важного частного случая, как турниры, то есть для таких 
случаев, когда отношение мажоритарного доминирования на всей совокупности альтернатив пред-
ставимо полным, связным, асимметричным графом.
III. Для турниров на основе понятия устойчивости альтернативы и множества альтернатив построе-
ны обобщения непокрытого множества и слабоустойчивого множества – классы k-устойчивых альтер-
натив и k-устойчивых множеств. Установлено наличие отношения включения для этих классов.
IV. Построены обобщения минимального доминирующего множества и с их помощью выяснено, 
как устроена система доминирующих множеств в общем случае. Показано, что для турниров иерар-
хии классов k-устойчивых альтернатив и k-устойчивых множеств в совокупности с иерархией доми-
нирующих множеств порождают соответственно микро- и макроструктуру множества альтернатив, 
в основе которых лежит различие в устойчивости.
Методологической парадигмой исследования является теория рационального выбора. Основные 
методы и средства относятся к математическому аппарату теории графов и теории множеств. 
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2. minimal Weakly Stable Set, Uncovered Set  
and other concepts based on majority relation1
Majority relation and related concepts
A finite set A of alternatives is given, |A|>2. Throughout the paper lower-
case letters (except CW) denote alternatives; capital letters denote sets of al-
ternatives. Agents from a finite set N={1, …, n}, |N|>1 have preferences over 
alternatives from the set A. These preferences Ri (i∈N) are assumed to be com-
plete binary relations on A. A relation Ri, Ri⊆A×A can be represented as a un-
ion of two relations Pi and Ii, Ri=Pi∪Ii, Pi∩Ii=∅, one of which (Pi) is asym-
metric (∀x, y∈A (x, y)∈Pi⇒ (y, x)∉Pi), thus representing strong preference, 
the other one (Ii) is symmetric (∀x, y∈A xIiy ⇒ yIix), therefore it stands for a 
subrelation of indifference. 
Majority relation is a binary relation µ, µ⊂A×A constructed such that 
(x, y)∈µ if x is strongly preferred to y by majority, whichever defined, of all 
agents. For simple majority xµy ⇔ card{i∈N xPiy}>card{i∈N yRix}. If xµy then 
it is said that x dominates y, and y is dominated by x. By assumption µ is asym-
metric: (x, y)∈µ ⇒ (y, x)∉µ.
If neither (x, y)∈µ, nor (y, x)∈µ holds, then (x, y) is called a tie. A set of ties 
τ is a symmetric binary relation on A: τ⊆A×A, (x, y)∈τ ⇒ (y, x)∈τ. By defini-
tion µ∩τ=∅ and µ∪τ= A×A.
A relation µ is called a tournament if it is complete. Thus µ is a tournament 
when corresponding τ is empty, τ=∅. A tournament can be represented graphi-
cally by a complete asymmetric directed graph, where vertices correspond to 
alternatives, and directed lines (exactly one between each pair of vertices) rep-
resent majority relation, x→y ⇔ xµy. By established convention a directed line 
is going from a dominating alternative to dominated one. In general case there 
are also ties. Ties are not connected by lines. 
An ordered pair x→y is also called a step. A path x→y1→y2→…→yk-2→ 
yk-1→y from x to y is an ordered sequence of steps starting at x and ending at 
y, such that the second alternative in each step coincides with the first alterna-
tive of the next step. In other words a path is an ordered sequence of alterna-
tives x, y1, y2, …, yk-2, yk-1, y, such that each alternative dominates the follow-
ing one: xµy1, y1µy2, …, yk-2µyk-1, yk-1µy. The number of steps in a path is called 
path’s length. An alternative y is called reachable in k steps from x if there is a 
path of length k from x to y. 
1  The terminology, definitions and notation given in Section 2 are derived mainly from Ales-
kerov and Kurbanov (1999).
Lower contour set of an alternative x is a set L(x) of all alternatives dominated 
by x, L(x)={y∈A: xµy}. Correspondingly, upper contour set of an alternative x is 
a set D(x) of all alternatives dominating x, D(x)={y∈A: yµx}. A horizon of x is 
a set H(x) of all alternatives y, for which (x, y) is a tie, H(x)={y∈A: xτy}. Obvi-
ously, L(x)∪D(x)∪H(x)∪{x}=A. 
Dominant, undominated and untrapped sets
A Condorcet winner CW, CW∈A, is an alternative dominating all other al-
ternatives, ∀x∈A, x≠CW ⇒ CWµx. An alternative x is a weak Condorcet winner 
iff it is not dominated by any other alternative, while there is at least one alter-
native that ties x, ∀y∈A y≠x ⇒ (xµy or xτy) and ∃z∈A z≠x: xτz.
A set of all undominated alternatives is called a (majority) core Cr, x∈Cr ⇔ 
∀y∈A y≠x ⇒ (xµy or xτy).
A set D, D⊆A, is called a dominant set (Ward, 1961; Smith, 1973) if each 
alternative in D dominates each alternative outside D, ∀x, x∈D ⇔ {∀y∈A\D 
⇒ xµy}. A dominant set MD (≡MD(1)) will be called a minimal dominant set 
(Schwartz, 1977) if none of its proper subsets is a dominant set. A set MD(2) is 
called a minimal dominant set of the second degree if it is a minimal dominant 
set for a set A\MD. MD(i) is a minimal dominant set of the i’th degree if it is a 
minimal dominant set for a set A\(∪MD(j)), 1≤j≤i-1.
A set U, U⊆A, is called an undominated set (Ward, 1961) if no alterna-
tive outside U dominates some alternative in U, ∀x, x∈U ⇔ {∀y∈A\D ⇒ (y, 
x)∉µ}. An undominated set MU is called a minimal undominated set (Schwartz, 
1970) if none of its proper subsets is an undominated set. If such a set is not 
unique, then the social choice is defined as a union of these sets (Schwartz, 
1972), which will likewise be denoted as MU. The union of minimal undomi-
nated sets (strong top cycle) is always a subset of minimal dominant set (weak 
top cycle), MU⊆MD. Evidently a core Cr is always a subset of MU, Cr⊆MU, 
since each {x}, {x}: x∈Cr, is a minimal undominated set.
It is said that x traps y if x dominates y and is not reachable from y via µ, xµy 
and there is no path from y to x (Duggan, 2007). An untrapped set (Duggan, 
2007) UT is comprised of all alternatives that are not trapped. UT is always non-
empty and is nested between the strong and weak top cycles, MU⊆UT⊆MD 
(Duggan, 2007), consequently Cr⊆UT.
lemma 1. If D1 and D2 are dominant sets then either D1⊆D2 or D2⊆D1.
lemma 2. A minimal dominant set always exists and is unique. 
The counterpart of Lemma 2 for tournaments was proved by Miller 
(1977).
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It follows from the definitions that any dominant set is at the same time an 
undominated set. Thus Lemma 2 implies non-emptiness of MU, which im-
plies non-emptiness of UT. For tournaments the notions of dominant and un-
dominated sets coincide, i.e. MD=MU. Consequently, for tournaments the 
untrapped set coincides with the minimal dominant set (Duggan, 2007).
lemma 3. If D is a dominant set then it is a direct sum of i minimal dominant 
sets of the first i degrees, D=MD+MD(2)+…+MD(j-1)+MD(j)+…+MD(i).
According to Lemma 3 a set of all dominant sets in A for any µ might be 
represented as a sequence of s sets, MD⊂D(2)⊂…⊂D(i-1)⊂D(i)⊂…⊂D(s)=A,
D(i)=MD+MD(2)+…+MD(j-1)+MD(j)+…+MD(i), D(i)\D(i-1)=MD(i). 
By construction minimal dominant sets of different degree do not intersect, 
and the union of all these sets coincides with the set A. Consequently, any al-
ternative belongs to one and only one set MD(i). Thus the hierarchy of domi-
nant sets can be considered as a macrostructure of A, where all elements, i.e. 
alternatives, are distributed by “vertically” ordered layers {MD(i)}.
Historical remark. Ward (1961) called dominant and undominated sets “ma-
jority sets” chosen under the “strong” and “weak” procedures respectively. 
Neither Ward (1961), no Smith (1973) formulated a condition of minimality 
for the sets they had introduced. The other names of the minimal dominant set 
are “minimal undominated set”, “Condorcet set” (Miller, 1977); “GETCHA” 
(Schwartz, 1986); “weak top cycle”. Though Fishburn (1977) does not define 
this concept explicitly, he speaks of “Smith’s Condorcet principle”, which is 
equivalent to choosing only alternatives from a minimal dominant set. The other 
names of the minimal undominated set are “GOCHA” (Schwartz, 1977, 1986); 
“undominated set” chosen under ”Schwartz’s rule” (Deb, 1977); “Schwartz 
choice set“, “minimal externally undominated” set (Fishburn, 1977); “strong 
top cycle”. If all individual preferences Ri are antisymmetric, ∀i Ri=Pi, and 
if majority is defined as consensus of agents, then the minimal dominant sets 
of different degrees {MD(i)} coincide with equivalence classes, defined by Ka-
dane (1966).
Uncovered and uncaptured sets
Before a definition of an uncovered set is given, let us define the covering 
relation on A. It turns out that there are five different definitions of covering: 
1) y covers x if yµx and L(x)⊆L(y)∪H(y) (Duggan, 2007), then x is uncov-
ered ⇔ ∀y: yµx ⇒ ∃z: xµz & zµy;
2) y covers x if yµx and L(x)⊆L(y) (Miller, 1980), then x is uncovered ⇔ 
∀y: yµx ⇒ ∃z: (xµz&zµy) or (xµz&zτy));
3) y covers x if yµx and D(y)⊆D(x) (Fishburn, 1977; Miller, 1980), then x 
is uncovered ⇔ ∀y: yµx ⇒ ∃z: (xµz & zµy) or (xτz & zµy);
4) y covers x if yµx and L(x)⊆L(y) & D(y)⊆D(x) (Miller, 1980; McKelvey, 
1986), then x is uncovered ⇔ ∀y: yµx ⇒ ∃z: (xµz & zµy) or (xµz &zτy) or (xτz 
& zµy);
5) y covers x if yµx and H(x)∪L(x)⊆L(y) (Duggan, 2007), then x is uncovered 
⇔ ∀y: yµx ⇒ ∃z: (xµz & zµy) or (xµz & zτy) or (xτz & zµy) or (xτz & zτy).
The definitions are listed according to their relative “strength”: the strength 
of covering decreases, and the number of uncovered alternatives correspond-
ingly increases with increase of the definition’s number. It follows from the 
definitions of the upper and lower contour sets and from transitivity of the re-
lation of inclusion that the relation of covering under the second, third, fourth 
and fifth definitions is transitive. Cycles of covering are possible under the first 
definition. For a tournament all five definitions of covering are equivalent. Re-
lation of covering has no symmetric component under all five definitions listed 
above, i.e. if x covers y then it is not possible for y to cover x.
The uncovered set (Fishburn, 1977; Miller, 1980) UC is comprised of all al-
ternatives that are not covered. An uncovered set, whichever defined, is unique. 
Let UCI, UCII, UCIII, UCIV and UCV denote uncovered sets under the first, 
second, third, fourth and fifth definitions of covering respectively. Evident-
ly, UCIV=UCII∪UCIII, UCI⊆UCII⊆UCIV, UCI⊆UCIII⊆UCIV and UCIV⊆UCV. 
UCII and UCIII are not logically nested. Let us consider the following exam-
ple: A={a, b, c, x, y, z}, µ={(a, b), (b, c), (c, a), (x, a), (x, b), (x, y), (y, z), 
(z, b), (z, x)} (see Figure 1). Here UCII={b, c, x, y, z}, UCIII={a, c, x, y, z}, 
UCII\UCIII={b}; UCIII\UCII={a}.
If a relation is transitive, it always possesses maximal elements. Therefore 
sets UCII, UCIII, UCIV and UCV are always non-empty, while UCI may be emp-
ty. For instance, let A={a, b, c, d}, µ={(a, b), (b, c), (c, d), (d, a)}. According 
to the first definition of covering a covers b, b covers c, c covers d and d cov-
ers a, i.e. there is a cycle of covering, including all alternatives in A. Therefore 
UCI=∅.
Since any undominated alternative is by definition uncovered, a core is a 
subset of any UC, Cr⊆UC. It is possible that the inclusion is strict, Cr⊂UC. 
For instance, let A={a, b, c, d}, µ={(a, b), (b, c), (c, d), (d, b)} then Cr={a}, 
UCI={a, c, d}.
The relation UC⊆MD holds for all five versions of covering, whereas MU and 
all UC are not logically nested in general case: in tournaments UC⊆MU=MD, 
while digraph on Figure 1 shows that MU⊂UCI is also possible: MU={x, y, 
z}; UCI={c, x, y, z}, UCIV=UCV=A. This example also proves that the sets 
UCII, UCIII, UCIV and UCV are not logically nested with UT: in tournaments 
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UCII=UCIII=UCIV=UCV⊆UT=MD, while UT⊂UCII, UT⊂UCIII, UT⊂UCIV 
and UT⊂UCV are also possible, since here UT=MU={x, y, z}. By the first defi-
nition of covering UCI is always a subset of UT, UCI⊆UT. 
z b c
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Fig. 1
An alternative x captures an alternative y, if x 1) covers y according to the 
fourth definition of covering and 2) covers all alternatives from the lower con-
tour set of y according to the third definition of covering, D(x)⊆D(z), ∀z∈L(y) 
(Duggan, 2007). Then x is uncaptured ⇔ ∀y: yµx ⇒ 
either ∃z: (xµz & zµy) or (xµz &zτy) or (xτz & zµy); 
or ∃v, w: (xµv & vµw & wµy) or (xµv & vτw & wµy).
An uncaptured set (Duggan, 2007) UCp is comprised of all alternatives 
that are not captured. By definition UCIV⊆UCp, consequently, Cr⊆UCp, 
UCI⊆UCp, UCII⊆UCp, UCIII⊆UCp and UCp is always nonempty. The un-
captured set is a subset of the minimal dominant set, UCp⊆MD (Duggan, 
2007). UCp is not logically nested with UCV, UT and MU: in tournaments 
UC⊆UCp⊆MU=UT=MD, while UCp⊂UCV, MU⊂UCp and UT⊂UCp are 
also possible. The possibility of inclusions MU⊂UCp and UT⊂UCp is again 
proved by the graph from Figure 1, since there UCp=A. To show the possibil-
ity of UCp⊂UCV let us consider another example: A={a, b, c, x, y, z}, µ={(a, 
b), (a, c), (b, c), (x, y), (x, z), (y, z), (z, c)} (see Figure 2). Here UCp={c, x, 
z} and UCV=A.
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Fig. 2
Historical remark. In fact, both Fishburn and Miller did not include a de-
mand for yµx into their definitions. Respectively Miller (1980, p. 94) propos-
es only L(x)⊆L(y) & D(y)⊆D(x) as a definition of covering for general case, 
τ≠∅. For tournaments this discrepancy does not make any difference, but in 
general case it does. The condition yµx in the definitions of covering is what 
makes relation of covering asymmetric. If it is dropped then one gets five more 
versions of covering and uncovered sets. These “new” relations may possess a 
symmetric component. For instance, if xτy and L(x)=L(y) then under original 
Miller’s definition of covering (without demand for xµy or yµx) x cover y and 
y covers x. The condition yµx in the definitions of covering is also needed for 
them to be consistent with the concept of stability (especially when stability is 
interpreted dynamically) and with a definition of the uncaptured set. 
The term “uncovered set” was introduced by Miller. Fishburn talks of an 
”image of Fishburn’s social choice function”.
Weakly stable sets
A set WS is called a weakly stable set (Aleskerov, Kurbanov, 1999) if it has 
the following property: if x belongs to a weakly stable set, then for any alterna-
tive y outside the weakly stable set, which dominates x, there is an alternative 
z in the weakly stable set, which dominates y, ∀x∈A, x∈WS ⇔ (∃y∉WS: yµx 
⇒ ∃z∈WS: zµy). In terms of D(x) and L(x) WS is weakly stable ⇔ (∀y∉WS 
WS∩L(y)≠∅ ⇒ WS∩D(y)≠∅). A weakly stable set MWS is called a minimal 
weakly stable set if none of its proper subsets is a weakly stable set. If such set 
is not unique, then the social choice is defined as a union of these sets (Ales-
kerov, Kurbanov, 1999), which will likewise be denoted MWS. 
According to the definition if x is undominated then {x} is a minimal weakly 
stable set, therefore a core is a subset of MWS, Cr⊆MWS. The inclusion may 
be strict, Cr⊂MWS. For instance, let A={a, b, c, d}, µ={(a, b), (b, c), (c, d), 
(d, b)} then Cr={a}, MWS={a, c, d}. It also follows from the definitions that 
any dominant set is at the same time a weakly stable set. Thus Lemma 2 im-
plies non-emptiness of MWS.
lemma 4. MWS⊆MD.
corollary. Since MU, MWS, all UC (except UCI), UCp, UT are always nonemp-
ty, then if there is a Condorcet winner CW, all sets coincide with a core, which con-
tains only one alternative — CW, MD=MU=MWS=UC=UCp=UT=Cr={CW}. 
It follows from the definition of UCI that the same also holds for UCI.
The definition of a minimal weakly stable set proposed by Aleskerov and 
Kurbanov is global. For practical calculations one needs a criterion to deter-
mine whether an alternative belongs to a minimal weakly stable set or not. For 
tournaments such criterion is given by Theorem 1. But before that, two impor-
tant properties of weakly stable sets should be established.
lemma 5. If µ is a tournament, then B is a weakly stable set iff ∀y∉Β ⇒ 
B∩D(y)≠∅. That is B is a weakly stable set iff there is one-step path from some 
alternative in B to any alternative outside B.
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corollary (monotonicity). Let B⊆C. If B is a weakly stable set then C is a 
weakly stable set. If C is not a weakly stable set then B is not a weakly stable 
set.
theorem 1. If µ is a tournament, then an alternative x belongs to a union of 
minimal weakly stable sets MWS iff 1) either x is uncovered or 2) some alter-
native from x’s lower contour set L(x) is uncovered. 
corollary. For tournaments, the uncovered set is a subset of the union of 
minimal weakly stable sets, UC⊆MWS⊆MD⊆A.
It is worth noting that there are tournaments for which inclusion is strict, 
UC⊂MWS⊂MD⊂A. For example let A={a, b, c, d, e, f} and µ={(a, c), (a, d), 
(a, e), (a, f), (b, a), (b, d), (b, e), (b, f), (c, b), (c, e), (c, f), (d, c), (d, f), (e, 
d), (e, f)} (see Figure 3), then UC={a, b, c}, MWS={a, b, c, d} and MD={a, 
b, c, d, e}.
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Fig. 3
Corollary of Lemma 5 and the proof of Theorem 1 depend on the assump-
tion that µ is a tournament through the proposition of Lemma 5 only. That is 
in general case if Lemma 5 holds then so do Corollary and Theorem 1. Thus 
it is possible to take Lemma 5 as a second definition of a weakly stable set: a set 
WS is weakly stable if ∀y∉WS ⇒ WS∩D(y)≠∅. Let MWSI and MWSII denote 
a union of minimal weakly stable set under the old and new definitions of weak 
stability correspondingly. In a tournament these definitions of weak stability 
are equivalent. 
Theorem 1 shall be restated as
theorem 1a. For any majority relation µ an alternative x belongs to a minimal 
stable set MWSII iff x is uncovered according to the third definition of covering 
or some alternative from the lower contour of x is uncovered according to the 
third definition of covering, x∈MWSII ⇔ x∈UCIII or ∃y: y∈L(x) & y∈UCIII.
corollary. A union of minimal weakly stable sets MWSII is a superset for 
an uncovered set UCIII (and thus for a core) and a subset of an uncaptured set 
UCp, Cr⊆UCIII⊆MWSII⊆UCp. 
There are µ such that MWSII⊂UCp, for example one depicted on Figure 2. 
There MWSII={a, x} amd UCp={a, x, z}.
If µ is not assumed to be a tournament, then corresponding modification in the 
proof of Lemma 5 (a change of D(x)∪L(x)∪{x}=A for D(x)∪L(x)∪H(x)∪{x}=A) 
yields the following consideration. Aleskerov-Kurbanov’s definition of a weak-
ly stable set (x∈WS ⇔ (∃y∉WS: yµx ⇒ ∃z∈WS: zµy)) implies that B is weakly 
stable iff ∀y∉Β B∩D(y)≠∅ or B⊆H(y). That is a set, which is weakly stable 
by the second definition, is weakly stable according to the original version of 
weak stability. At the same time there are sets not weakly stable by the former 
definition but weakly stable according to the latter one, namely, when ∀y∉Β 
⇒ (B∩D(y)≠∅ or B∈H(y)) and ∃z∉Β: B∈H(z). Moreover, in general case 
weak stability retains its monotonicity only under the second definition, where-
as under the original version it is possible for some B, C, D: D⊂C⊂B⊂A that 
C may not be a weakly stable set while B and D are weakly stable. As a result, 
a weakly set B, which is minimal according to the second definition may not 
be minimal according to the first one, since it may contain a proper subset C, 
C⊂B, such that it is weakly stable by the first definition and is not weakly sta-
ble by the second one.
Lemma 6 establishes logical relations for the rest of all pairs of sets intro-
duced so far.
lemma 6. MWSI is not logically nested with UCI, UCII, UCIII, UCIV, 
UCV, MWSII, MU; MWSI⊆UCp and ∃µ: MWSI⊂UCp; MWSI⊆UT and ∃µ: 
MWSI⊂UT; MWSII is not logically nested with UCII, UCIV, UCV, MU and UT; 
UCI⊆MWSII; MWSII⊆MD.
Table 2 and Table 3 in Conclusion summarize the relations between all 
twelve sets Cr, UCI, UCII, UCIII, UCIV, UCV, MWSI, MWSII, UCp, MU, UT 
and MD for general case and for tournaments respectively.
3. k-stable2 alternatives, k-stable sets and their relationship
From now on, unless it is specifically noted, only tournaments will be con-
sidered.
k-stable points
We can deepen our understanding of the uncovered and weakly stable sets 
and generalize these notions if we consider the relative stability of alternatives 
2  The notion and the general idea were proposed by F. Aleskerov.
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and sets of alternatives. An alternative x will be called generally stable if every 
other alternative in A is reachable from x, otherwise x is unstable.
Remark. Thus defined stability is also open for a dynamic interpretation. It 
is natural to view a certain position (a state of a system) as more stable one if it 
is less subject to change. In a voting game a “state of a system” is either an al-
ternative, which is a status quo, or a certain set of alternatives, to which a status 
quo belongs. Thus a state is less subject to change if it takes less effort (steps, 
rounds of voting) to return to the same state (to adopt the same alternative or an 
alternative from the same set of alternatives by the process of consequent voting) 
after a “perturbation”, i.e. after a status quo was outvoted and changed.
Every alternative in A is reachable from x iff x belongs to a minimal domi-
nant set (Miller, 1977), thus all alternatives of a minimal dominant set and only 
they are generally stable.
Since A is finite, if y is reachable from x, then there is a path from x to y 
with a minimal length. Let l(x, y) denote a minimal length function. The func-
tion l(x, y) has the following property: l(x, y)>1 ⇒ l(y, x)=1.
For x and y, such that x∈D, y∈A\D, where D is a dominant set, l(y, x) is 
not defined, as x is not reachable from y. For such cases let l(y, x)=∞. If x be-
longs to a minimal dominant set, l(x, y) is defined and has a finite value for all 
y∈A\{x}. Let l(x, x)=0 for l(x, y) to be defined on the whole set A. In terms of 
l(x, y) x is generally stable when ∀y∈A l(x, y)<∞. 
Let lmax(x) denote a function of x defined as lmax(x)=maxy∈Al(x, y). If 
lmax(x)=k<∞ then it is possible to reach any alternative in A from x in no more 
than k steps, but there is at list one alternative reachable from x in less than k 
steps. The function lmax(x) may serve as a measure of stability and thus helps in 
comparison of alternatives by their stability and in separation of them by classes 
of stability. Therefore, let the value of lmax(x) be called a degree of stability of x. 
If the degree of stability of an alternative x is k, k<∞, x will be called k-stable. 
Let SP(k) denote a class of k-stable points, i.e. a set of all k-stable alternatives 
in A, x∈SP(k) ⇔ lmax(x)=k. An algorithm for calculating the classes of k-stable 
alternatives and the minimal dominant sets is given in Appendix 2.
An alternative x has the degree of stability k=1 iff x is a Condorcet win-
ner, x=CW. Therefore SP(1)={CW}. It is also evident that if SP(1)≠∅, then all 
SP(k>1)=∅, since CW is not reachable from any other alternative.
An alternative x has the degree of stability k=2 iff x is an uncovered alterna-
tive, i.e. SP(2) is an uncovered set UC, SP(2)=UC (Miller, 1980).
By construction the classes of stable alternatives do not intersect, 
SP(i)∩SP(j)=∅, i≠j. Since all alternatives that are generally stable belong to a min-
imal dominant set MD, and all alternatives from MD are generally stable, MD 
is a direct sum of all classes of k-stable alternatives, MD=SP(1)+SP(2)+SP(3)+…
+SP(k)+… Since A is finite, there is a generally stable alternative (at least one), 
the degree of stability of which is maximal m=maxx∈MDlmax(x). It follows im-
mediately that 1) ∀k>m SP(k)=∅; 2) SP(m)≠∅; 3) MD=SP(1)+SP(2)+SP(3)+…
+SP(m).
theorem 2. (Nonemptiness of point-classes) If there is no Condorcet winner, 
each class of k-stable alternatives with the degree k equal or less than maximal 
is nonempty, except SP(1), ∀SP(k)≠∅, 2≤k≤m=maxx∈MDlmax(x).
Finally, let P(k) denote a set of those generally stable alternatives, from which it 
is possible to reach any given alternative in A in no more than k steps. By definition 
P(k)=SP(1)+SP(2)+…+SP(k). According to the definition of the capturing relation, 
x is uncaptured if it is possible to reach any other alternative in A in no more than 
3 steps, thus P(3) is the uncaptured set UCp, P(3)=SP(1)+SP(2)+SP(3)=UCp
Therefore the following system of subsets can be defined in a minimal dom-
inant set.
P(1)={CW}=MD; if P(1)=∅, then 
P(2)=UC≠∅, an uncovered set;
P(3)=UCp, an uncaptured set;
P(1)⊂P(2)⊂P(3)⊂… ⊂P(m-1)⊂P(m)=MD, m=maxx∈MDlmax(x), all inclusions are 
strict according to Theorem 2.
k-stable sets
Similarly to alternatives, a set of alternatives X will be called generally stable 
set if it is possible to reach any alternative outside X from some alternative in X, 
otherwise X is unstable. An alternative y outside X is reachable in k steps from X 
if there is a k-step path to y from some x in X. Since all alternatives are reach-
able from alternatives in a minimal dominant set, but alternatives in MD are 
not reachable from outside, any set X, which has nonempty intersection with 
MD, ∀X: X∩MD≠∅, is generally stable, otherwise it is unstable.
In terms of l(x, y), X is generally stable if ∀y∈A\X ∃x∈X: l(x, y)<∞. A func-
tion l(X, y)=minx∈Xl(x, y) for any y∈A\X will be called a minimal length function, 
which represents a distance from a given set X to a given alternative y outside X. 
l(X, y)=∞ when y is not reachable from X. Let l(X, y)=0 if y∈X. 
Correspondingly, lmax(X)=maxy∈Al(X, y). If lmax(X)=k<∞ then ∀y∈A ∃x∈X: 
l(x, y)≤k & ∃y∈A\X: ∀x∈X l(x, y)≥k. 
The value of lmax(X) will be called the degree of stability of a set of alter-
natives X. If the degree of stability of X is k, the set X will be called k-stable. 
A k-stable set will be called a minimal k-stable set if none of its proper subsets 
is a k-stable set. 
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Let SS(k) denote a class of those alternatives, which belong to some mini-
mal k-stable set, but do not belong to any minimal stable set with the degree 
of stability less than k. By construction these classes do not intersect, ∀i≠j 
SS(i)∩SS(j)=∅.
Finally, let S(k) denote a union of those minimal generally stable sets, from 
which it is possible to reach any alternative outside a set in no more than k 
steps. 
Evidently, S(k)=SS(1)+SS(2)+…+SS(k)
It follows from Lemma 5 that a k-stable set of degree k=1 is equivalent to 
a weakly stable set. Therefore S(1) coincides with the union of minimal weakly 
stable sets MWS, S(1)=MWS.
There is a relationship between all these sets, which were introduced above 
on a basis of an idea of stability, the relationship similar to one, which is estab-
lished for the uncovered set and the union of the weakly stable sets by Theorem 1. 
Theorem 3 determines this relationship.
theorem 3. 1) P(2)⊆S(1)⊆P(3) (i.e. UC⊆MWS⊆UCp); ∃µ: P(2)⊂S(1)⊂P(3);
2) ∀k: k>1 P(k)⊆S(k)⊆P(k+2).
corollary 1. ∀k: k>3 x∈SS(1) ⇒ (x∈SP(2) or x∈SP(3)) & x∉SP(k).
corollary 2. ∀k: k=2 or k>4 x∈SS(2) ⇒ (x∈SP(3) or x∈SP(4)) & x∉SP(k).
corollary 3. ∀i: i>k+2 or i<k x∈SS(k), ∀k: k>2 ⇒ (x∈SP(k) or x∈SP(k+1) or 
x∈SP(k+2)) & x∉SP(i). 
corollary 4. ∀i: i>k or i<k-2 x∈SP(2) ⇒ x∈SS(1); x∈SP(k), ∀k: k>2 ⇒ (x∈SS(k-2) 
or x∈SS(k-1) or x∈SS(k)) & x∉SS(i).
Finally, let us consider the following examples: A={a, b, v, w, x, y, z};
µ1={(a, b), (a, w), (a, x), (a, y), (a, z), (b, v), (b, x), (b, y), (b, z), (v, a), (v, w), 
(v, x), (v, z), (w, b), (w, x), (w, y), (x, y), (x, z), (y, v), (y, z), (z, w)} (Figure 4);
 a
 b
 v
 w x
 y
 z
Fig. 4
µ2={(a, b), (a, w), (a, x), (a, y), (a, z), (b, v), (b, x), (b, y), (b, z), (v, a), 
(v, w), (v, x), (v, z), (w, b), (w, x), (w, y), (x, y), (x, z), (y, v), (z, w), (z, y)} (F i-
gure 5);
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 b
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 z
Fig. 5
µ3={(a, b), (a, w), (a, x), (a, y), (a, z), (b, v), (b, x), (b, y), (b, z), (v, a), (v, 
x), (v, z), (w, b), (w, v), (w, x), (w, y), (x, y), (x, z), (y, v), (z, w), (z, y)} (Fig-
ure 6).
 a
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Fig. 6
For each digraph Table 1 shows distribution of alternatives by point-classes 
{SP(k)} and set-classes {SS(k)}.
Table 1. Distribution of points by point-classes {SP(k)} and set-classes {SS(k)}
Figure 4 Figure 5 Figure 6
SP(2) SP(3) SP(2) SP(3) SP(4) SP(2) SP(3)
SS(1) a, b, v y, w SS(1) a, b, v y, w SS(1) a, b, v, w y, z
SS(2) z SS(2) z SS(2)
SS(3) x SS(3) x SS(3) x
These examples show that all three theoretically possible options hold: 
x∈(SS(k-2), SP(k)), x∈(SS(k-1), SP(k)), x∈(SS(k), SP(k)). Therefore the statement 
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of Theorem 3 can not be made stronger. Evidently, the inclusion P(2)⊆S(1) is 
just a “boundary effect”, and it can not be generalized. 
Together with Example 3 they also prove that the cases when SS(k)=∅, or 
even SS(k-1)=∅ & SS(k)=∅ are possible. Therefore there is no counterpart of 
Theorem 2 for set-classes {SS(k)}. The cases where SS(k-2)=∅, SS(k-1)=∅, SS(k)=∅ 
for any k: k≤m, m=maxx∈MDlmax(x) are impossible, since SS(k-2)=∅, SS(k-1)=∅, 
SS(k)=∅ implies SP(k)=∅, a contradiction with Theorem 2.
It is important to note that P(k)⊆S(k)⊆P(k+2) does not imply that either 
P(k)⊆S(k)⊆P(k+1) or P(k+1)⊆S(k)⊆P(k+2) holds. The distribution table of a digraph 
from Figure 5 demonstrates that there are cases with such pairs of alternatives 
(x, y), where one alternative belongs to a point-class of greater degree and to a 
set-class of lesser degree than the other one, x∈(SS(k-2), SP(k)), y∈(SS(k-1), SP(k-1)). 
Therefore, even though it is possible to compare all alternatives by stability us-
ing point-classes {SP(k)} or set-classes {SS(k)} independently, there is no natu-
ral aggregated order: one may call x more stable than y when x∈(SS(k), SP(l)), 
y∈(SS(m), SP(n)), k≤m, l≤n & (k<m or l<n), but it is impossible to compare al-
ternatives x∈(SS(k-2), SP(k)) and y∈(SS(k-1), SP(k-1)).
4. conclusion
In the rational choice paradigm the main problem is a general absence of a 
core. The core exists so rarely, that one needs 1) either to make quite restrictive 
assumptions with regard to a space of individual preferences to guarantee its ex-
istence, 2) or to find a solution concept, which can be used as a substitute. For 
instance, in the spatial theory of voting a notion of ideology is used as a means 
to make an issue space one-dimensional (Ferejohn, 1995) in order to ensure 
the existence of a median voter, who’s ideal point is a Condorcet winner. In 
the multi-dimensional setting the median voter exists only under non-robust 
Plott’s pairwise symmetry conditions (Plott, 1967) for majority rule equilib-
rium. In this paper the latter approach was chosen.
Several such solutions concepts were considered and compared: Cr, UCI, 
UCII, UCIII, UCIV, UCV, MWSI, MWSII, UCp, MU, UT and MD. Tables 2 and 
3 summarize their relations for general case and for tournaments respectively. 
The symbol “⊆” in a cell points out that a set of a corresponding row R is al-
ways a subset of a set of a corresponding column C, R⊆C. The symbol “n.n.” 
points out that sets R and C are not logically nested. The symbol “=” points 
out that sets R and C are equivalent.
Table 2. General case
Uci Ucii Uciii Uciv Ucv mWSi mWSii Ucp mU Ut mD
cr ⊆ ⊆ ⊆ ⊆ ⊆ ⊆ ⊆ ⊆ ⊆ ⊆ ⊆
Uci ⊆ ⊆ ⊆ ⊆ n.n. ⊆ ⊆ n.n. ⊆ ⊆
Ucii n.n. ⊆ ⊆ n.n. n.n. ⊆ n.n. n.n. ⊆
Uciii ⊆ ⊆ n.n. ⊆ ⊆ n.n. n.n. ⊆
Uciv ⊆ n.n. n.n. ⊆ n.n. n.n. ⊆
Ucv n.n. n.n. n.n. n.n. n.n. ⊆
mWSi n.n. ⊆ n.n. ⊆ ⊆
mWSii ⊆ n.n. n.n. ⊆
Ucp n.n. n.n. ⊆
mU ⊆ ⊆
Ut ⊆
Table 3. Tournaments
UCI Ucii Uciii Uciv Ucv mWSi mWSii Ucp mU Ut mD
cr ⊆ ⊆ ⊆ ⊆ ⊆ ⊆ ⊆ ⊆ ⊆ ⊆ ⊆
Uci = = = = ⊆ ⊆ ⊆ ⊆ ⊆ ⊆
Ucii = = = ⊆ ⊆ ⊆ ⊆ ⊆ ⊆
Uciii = = ⊆ ⊆ ⊆ ⊆ ⊆ ⊆
Uciv = ⊆ ⊆ ⊆ ⊆ ⊆ ⊆
Ucv ⊆ ⊆ ⊆ ⊆ ⊆ ⊆
mWSi = ⊆ ⊆ ⊆ ⊆
mWSii ⊆ ⊆ ⊆ ⊆
Ucp ⊆ ⊆ ⊆
mU = =
Ut =
Miller (1977) proved for tournaments that outcomes for some important 
majority voting games are localized in the minimal dominant set of alterna-
tives. Here it was demonstrated that any set of alternatives A with a majority 
relation µ defined over it possesses an internal structure created by a hierarchy 
of minimal dominant sets {MD(i)}, which at the same time is a system of all 
dominant sets {D(i)} in A with given µ.
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D(1)⊂D(2)⊂…⊂D(i-1)⊂D(i)⊂…⊂D(s)=A,
D(i)=MD+MD(2)+…+MD(j-1)+MD(j)+…+MD(i), D(i)\D(i-1)=MD(i). 
The highest level of this hierarchy is the minimal dominant set proper 
MD. 
Miller (1980) introduced the concept of an uncovered set. Aleskerov and 
Kurbanov (1999) defined the minimal weakly stable set. Here it was demon-
strated that the minimal weakly stable set is related to the notion of covering 
and to the uncovered set. It was shown that these two concepts are intimately 
connected with an idea of stability.
As an attempt to generalize the notions of the uncovered set and the mini-
mal weakly stable set the concepts of k-stable alternatives and k-stable sets of 
alternatives were introduced. It was demonstrated that the systems of classes of 
k-stable alternatives {SP(k)} (point-classes) and classes of minimal k-stable sets 
{SS(k)} (set-classes) form substructures in the minimal dominant set similar to 
the structure that dominant sets create in the universal set A, i. e.
1) P(2)⊂P(3)⊂… ⊂P(m-1)⊂P(m)=MD, P(k)=SP(1)+SP(2)+…+SP(k);
2) S(1)⊂S(2)⊂S(3)⊂… ⊂S(n-1)⊂S(n)=MD, S(k)=SS(1)+SS(2)+…+SS(k). 
The uncovered set and the union of minimal weakly stable sets are the high-
est levels in the hierarchies of point-classes and set-classes, P(2) and S(1), respec-
tively. It also turned out that the second element in the first hierarchy is the 
uncaptured set: P(3)=UCp. Corollary of Theorem 1 was generalized and it was 
demonstrated that these systems of classes are related to each other through the 
relation of inclusion P(2)⊆S(1)⊆P(3) and P(k)⊆S(k)⊆P(k+2) for any k: k>1. It was also 
found that all point-classes {SP(k)} for any k: 2≤k≤kmax, are always nonempty 
for tournaments, which is not true about the set-classes {SS(k)}.
Although alternatives and sets not included in the minimal dominant set 
were defined as unstable, their “instability” is being of different degree. Since 
MD(i) is the minimal dominant set in A\D(i-1), one can measure the difference 
in stability of all points in A, not only those in MD, by defining similar systems 
of point-classes and set-classes for all MD(i), not only for the minimal domi-
nant set. As a result the system of dominant sets and systems of point-classes 
and set-classes represent respectively macro-scale structure and micro-scale 
substructure of a universal set. Since the classes do not intersect, and their hi-
erarchies cover the whole set A, for any tournament each alternative will be 
characterized by three numbers k, l, m, as belonging 1) to a minimal dominant 
set of k’th degree MD(k), 2) to a class of l-stable points SP(l) and 3) to a class of 
minimal m-stable sets SS(m) in MD(k). That is for tournaments, the hierarchy 
of dominant sets and respective hierarchies of classes of k-stable points and 
classes of minimal k-stable sets create a system of reference based on the prin-
ciple of stability. Therefore one may assess the relative stability of alternatives 
by comparing their coordinates in this system. 
Correspondingly each tournament (each complete digraph) is character-
ized by a distribution table, i.e. a table of distribution of alternatives (points) 
by classes, similar to Tables 1 and 4.3
appendix 1
example 1. (See Figure 1 in Section 2) ∃µ: 
MWSI=MU⊂UCI=UT⊂{UCII; UCIII}⊂UCIV=UCV=MWSII=UCp=MD; 
UCII\UCIII≠∅ & UCIII\UCII≠∅.
A={a, b, c, x, y, z}
µ={(a, b), (b, c), (c, a), (x, a), (x, b), (x, y), (y, z), (z, b), (z, x)}
MWSI=MU={x, y, z}; UCI=UT={c, x, y, z}; UCII={b, c, x, y, z}; UCIII={a, c, x, 
y, z}; UCII\UCIII={b}; UCIII\UCII={a}; UCIV=UCV=MWSII=UCp=MD=A
example 2. (See Figure 2 in Section 2) ∃µ: 
UCI=UCIII=MWSI=MWSII=MU=UT⊂UCII=UCIV=UCp⊂UCV=MD
A={a, b, c, x, y, z}
µ={(a, b), (a, c), (b, c), (x, y), (x, z), (y, z), (z, c)}
UCI=UCIII=MWSI=MWSII=MU=UT={a, x}; UCII=UCIV=UCp={a, x, 
z}; UCV=MD=A
example 3. (See Figure 3 in Section 2)
∃µ: UC⊂MWS⊂MD⊂A
A={a, b, c, d, e, f}
µ={(a, c), (a, d), (a, e), (a, f), (b, a), (b, d), (b, e), (b, f), (c, b), (c, e), (c, 
f), (d, c), (d, f), (e, d), (e, f)}
UC={a, b, c}, MWS={a, b, c, d}, MD={a, b, c, d, e}.
Table 4. Distribution of points by point-classes {SP(k)} and set-classes {SS(k)}
SP(2) SP(3) SP(4)
SS(1) a, b, c d
SS(2)
SS(3)
SS(4) e
3  Since all relevant definitions were based on the idea of proximity, the numbers of points in 
classes {MD(k)}, {SP(k)} and {SS(k)} are graph invariants.
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example 4. (see Figure 4)
∃µ: P(2)⊂S(1)⊂P(3)
A={a, b, v, w, x, y, z}
µ={(a, b), (a, w), (a, x), (a, y), (a, z), (b, v), (b, x), (b, y), (b, z), (v, a), (v, 
w), (v, x), (v, z), (w, b), (w, x), (w, y), (x, y), (x, z), (y, v), (y, z), (z, w)}
the uncovered set P(2) is {a, b, v},
the union of minimal weakly stable sets S(1) is {a, b, v, y, w},
P(3) coincides with the whole set A: alternatives x and z are 3-stable, but 
don’t belong to the union of minimal weakly stable sets.
example 5. (see Figure 5)
A={a, b, v, w, x, y, z}
µ={(a, b), (a, w), (a, x), (a, y), (a, z), (b, v), (b, x), (b, y), (b, z), (v, a), (v, 
w), (v, x), (v, z), (w, b), (w, x), (w, y), (x, y), (x, z), (y, v), (z, w), (z, y)}
example 6. (see Figure 6)
A={a, b, v, w, x, y, z}
µ={(a, b), (a, w), (a, x), (a, y), (a, z), (b, v), (b, x), (b, y), (b, z), (v, a), (v, 
x), (v, z), (w, b), (w, v), (w, x), (w, y), (x, y), (x, z), (y, v), (z, w), (z, y)}
example 7. (See Figure 7) ∃µ:
a b c
de
Fig. 7
MU⊂MWSI; MWSI\MWSII≠∅ & MWSII\MWSI≠∅.
A={a, b, c, d, e}
µ={(a, b), (b, c), (c, d), (c, e), (d, e), (e, b)}
MU={a}; UCI={a, c}; UCII={a, c, b, e}; UCIII={a, c, d}; MWSI={a, c, e}; 
MWSII={a, b, c, d}; MWSI\MWSII={e}; MWSII\MWSI={b, d}; UT={a, c, d, 
e}; UCIV=UCV=UCp=MD=A
appendix 2
Here some useful propositions are given, which yield an algorithm for cal-
culating the classes of k-stable alternatives and the minimal dominant sets for 
tournaments.
Let L2(x) denote x’s lower contour set of the second degree, which consists of 
all those y that belong to the lower contour sets of alternatives from the lower 
contour set of x but at the same time do not belong to x’s lower contour set it-
self, y∈L2(x) ⇔ ∃z∈L(x): y∈L(z) & y∉L(x). Correspondingly x’s lower contour 
set of the k’th degree Lk(x) consists of all those y that belong to the lower con-
tour sets of alternatives from Lk-1(x) but at the same time do not belong to any 
Li(x) of the degree less than k (k=1 included), y∈Lk(x) ⇔ ∃z∈Lk-1(x): y∈L(z) 
& y∉Li(x) for all i: i<k. In some instances lower contour set of x will be referred 
to as lower contour set of the degree 1, and we put L0(x)={x}.
It follows from the definition that if Lk(x)≠∅ then ∀i: i<k Li(x)≠∅. If 
∃y∈Lk(x) then there is a path x→y1→y2→…→yk-2→yk-1→y from x to y such 
that ∀i yi∈ Li(x). It follows from the construction of Lk(x) that if µ is a tourna-
ment and y∈Lk(x) then y dominates x and all alternatives from Li(x) for all i: 
i<k-1. Indeed, if y∈Lk(x) then ∀i: i<k y∉Li(x), consequently ∀z∈Li-1(x) y∉L(z) 
⇒ ∀z∈Li-1(x) for any i: i<k   y∈D(z), i.e. yµz.
Historical remark. Miller (1980, p. 70) introduced sets Rk(x) similar to L
k(x). 
In terms of Rk(x) L
k(x)=Rk(x)\Rk-1(x).
lemma 8. If x→y1→y2→…→yk-2→yk-1→y is a minimal path from x to y such 
that l(x, y)=k, then yi∈Li(x) for all i: i<k & y∈Lk(x).
corollary. If y is reachable from x, then ∃k: y∈Lk(x). Therefore, if x is gen-
erally stable then the union of all lower contour sets of x (L0(x) included) co-
incides with the whole set A, ∪Li(x)=A. 
According to Lemma 8 x∈SP(k) implies ∃y∈Lk(x). Therefore, if x is k-sta-
ble (k>1) there is an alternative y that dominates x and all alternatives from 
all Li(x), i: i≤k-2; x∈SP(k) ⇒ ∃y: yµx & ∀z∈Li(x) for all i: i≤k-2 yµz. Alterna-
tively, if there is y that dominates x and all alternatives from all Li(x), i: i≤k-2, 
then the degree of stability of x is no less than k. Indeed, if there is an alterna-
tive y that dominates x and all alternatives from Li(x) for any i: i≤k-2, then y 
is either not reachable from x or belongs to Lj(x) for any j: j≥k. In both cases 
y is not reachable from x in less than k steps, thus the degree of stability of x is 
no less than k. 
If x is k-stable (k>1) then all its lower contour sets of the degree k and less 
are nonempty, but all lower contour sets of the degree greater than k are emp-
ty, x∈SP(k) ⇒ ∀i: i≤k Li(x)≠∅ & ∀j: j>k Lj(x)=∅. Indeed, by definition if x 
is k-stable then Lk(x)≠∅, therefore ∀i: i<k Li(x)≠∅. Also by definition there 
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is no alternative in A not reachable from x in more than k steps, which means 
∀i: i>k Li(x)=∅.
This yields the following algorithm for calculating {SP(k)} and MD. To es-
tablish, which point-class any given alternative x belongs to, one should calcu-
late, one by one, all lowers contours Li(x) of x. If ∪Li(x)=A for all i: i≥0, then x 
is generally stable, consequently it belongs to MD. If x is generally stable then 
its nonempty lower contour of the greatest degree (Lk(x): Lk(x)≠∅ & ∀j: j>k 
Lj(x)=∅) will determine x’s degree of stability. Repeating the calculation for 
all alternatives in any given A one obtains MD and {SP(k)}.
An algorithm for calculation of set-classes {SS(k)} is related to calculation of 
weakly stable sets under Theorem 1 and will be presented in the next paper.
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lemma 1. Proof: Let on the contrary D1\D2≠∅ & D2\D1 ≠∅. Then ∃x, y: 
x∈D1\D2, y∈D2\D1, x≠y. Since D1 is a dominant set, then by definition xµy. 
Similarly, since D2 is a dominant set as well, yµx, a contradiction. 
lemma 2. Proof: Since A is finite, the number of subsets of A is finite. Ac-
cording to Lemma 1 one can order those subsets that are dominant sets by in-
clusion, and because their number is finite, one of them must be minimal.
If MD is a minimal dominant set then by definition there is no dominant 
set D such that D is a subset of MD (D⊂MD). Let D be a dominant set and 
D≠MD. According to Lemma 1 either MD is a subset of D (MD⊂D) or D is 
a subset of MD (D⊂MD). The latter is not true according to the definition, 
which implies MD must be a subset of D. Hence there is no minimal dominant 
set other than MD, i.e. minimal dominant set is unique. 
lemma 3. Proof: By construction ∀j≠i MD(j)∩MD(i) and ∪MD(i)=A, there-
fore ∀x: x∈D ⇒ ∃i: x∈MD(i). If D∩MD(i)≠∅, then D⊃MD(i). Suppose on 
the contrary D∩MD(i)≠∅ & MD(i)\D≠∅. Since D is a dominant set, ∀x, y: 
x∈D∩MD(i), y∈MD(i)\D ⇒ xµy. By definition of MD(i) ∀x, y: x∈D∩MD(i), 
y∈(A\∪MD(j))\MD(i), 1≤j≤i-1 ⇒ xµy. Therefore D∩MD(i) is a dominant set 
in A\∪MD(j), 1≤j≤i-1. MD(i)\D≠∅ ⇒ D∩MD(i)⊂MD(i) (Lemma 1), therefore 
MD(i) is not a minimal dominant set in A\∪MD(j), 1≤j≤i-1, a contradiction. 
Consequently, D must be a direct sum of a certain number of sets MD(i). 
By construction ∀x, y: x∈MD(i), y∈MD(k) for any k and i: k>i ⇒ xµy. There-
fore, if MD(i) is a minimal dominant set with the greatest degree among those 
included in D, all MD(j), 1≤j<i-1 must belong to D as well. Had it been other-
wise, D would have not been a dominant set. 
lemma 4. Proof: If MWS is a minimal weakly stable set then there is no 
weakly stable set WS such that is a subset of MWS, WS⊂MWS. If MWS is not a 
subset of MD then MWS\MD≠∅ and MWS∩MD≠MWS. By definition of MD, 
∀x, y: x∉MWS∩MD & y∈MWS∩MD & xµy ⇒ x∈MD\MWS. By definition 
of a weakly stable set, ∃z: z∈MWS & zµx. x∈MD ⇒ z∈MD ⇒ z∈MWS∩MD. 
Thus (∃ x, y: x∉MSW∩MD & y∈MSW∩MD & xµy) ⇒ ∃ z∈MSW∩MD: zµx. 
By definition MSW∩MD is a weakly stable set. (MSW∩MD)⊂MWS ⇒ MWS 
is not a minimal weakly stable set, a contradiction. Hence a minimal weakly 
stable set is a subset of the minimal dominant set.
lemma 5. Proof: Sufficiency. B is weakly stable ⇔ ∀x∉Β: B∩L(x)≠∅ ⇒ 
B∩D(x)≠∅. Therefore, if ∀x∉Β ⇒ B∩D(x)≠∅ then B is weakly stable. Ne-
cessity. Since µ is a tournament, ∀x∈A ⇒ D(x)∪L(x)∪{x}=A. If x∉Β then 
B⊆(D(x)∪L(x)). Consequently, B∩(D(x)∪L(x))=(B∩D(x))∪(B∩L(x))=B≠∅. 
Consequently, ∀B: B∩L(x)=∅ ⇒ B∩D(x)≠∅. Therefore, if B is weakly stable, 
i.e. if also B∩L(x)≠∅ ⇒ B∩D(x)≠∅ then ∀x ⇒ B∩D(x)≠∅. 
theorem 1. Proof: Suppose x∈B, B is a minimal weakly stable set. Then 
B\{x} is not weakly stable. According to Lemma 5 ∃y∉Β\{x}: (B\{x})∩D(y)=∅. 
At the same time ∀y∉Β ⇒ B∩D(y)≠∅. Therefore either x=y or x∈D(y). 
If x=y then (B\{x})∩D(y)=∅ ⇔ Β\{x}⊆A\(D(x)∪{x}) ⇔ Β⊆A\D(x). If 
B is weakly stable then by Corollary of Lemma 5 A\D(x) must be weakly sta-
ble as well. 
If x∈D(y) (⇔ y∈L(x)) then Β\{x}⊆A\(D(y)∪{y}) ⇔ Β⊆(A\(D(y)∪{y}))∪{x}, 
y∈L(x). If B is weakly stable then (A\(D(y)∪{y}))∪{x} must be weakly stable. 
As a result, if B is a minimal weakly stable set and x∈B then it is necessary 
that either one of the two conditions holds:
(*) A\D(x) is weakly stable;
(**) ∃y∈L(x): (A\(D(y)∪{y}))∪{x} is weakly stable.
Let’s prove that either one of the conditions is sufficient for the existence 
of a minimal weakly stable set B: x∈B. 
Suppose (*) holds. If A\D(x) is minimal then B=A\D(x). If it is not, then 
∃C: C⊂Α\D(x), C is a minimal weakly stable set. Evidently, x∉A\(D(x)∪{x}) & 
(A\(D(x)∪{x}))∩D(x)=∅, therefore A\(D(x)∪{x}) is not weakly stable. Since 
C is weakly stable, C is not a subset of A\(D(x)∪{x}). But C⊂A\D(x), there-
fore x∈С and B=C. 
Suppose (**) holds. If (A\(D(y)∪{y}))∪{x} is minimal then B=(A\
(D(y)∪{y}))∪{x}. If it is not, then ∃C: C⊂(A\(D(y)∪{y}))∪{x}, C is a mini-
mal weakly stable set. Evidently, y∉A\(D(y)∪{y}) and A\(D(y)∪{y})∩D(y)=∅, 
therefore A\(D(y)∪{y}) is not weakly stable. Since C is weakly stable, C is not 
a subset of A\(D(y)∪{y}). But C⊂(A\(D(y)∪{y}))∪{x}, therefore x∈С and 
B=C.
Thus, x belongs to any minimal weakly stable set iff A\D(x) is a weakly sta-
ble set or ∃y∈L(x) such that (A\(D(y)∪{y}))∪{x} is a weakly stable set.
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Suppose A\D(x) is not weakly stable then ∃z: z∉A\D(x) and 
(A\D(x))∩D(z)=∅, then A\D(x)⊆A\(D(z)∪{z}), then D(z)∪{z}⊆D(x) ⇔ 
(zµx & D(z)⊆D(x)). Therefore, if A\D(x) is not weakly stable then x is cov-
ered according to the third definition of covering.
Suppose x is covered by z, ∃z: zµx & D(z)⊆D(x). Then A\D(x)⊆A\(D(z)∪{z}), 
therefore ∃z: z∉A\D(x) & (A\D(x))∩D(z)=∅. According to Lemma 5 A\D(x) 
is not weakly stable. 
Therefore A\D(x) is weakly stable iff x is uncovered according to the third 
definition of covering.
Suppose ∃y∈L(x): (A\(D(y)∪{y}))∪{x} is not weakly stable then ∃z: z∉(A\
(D(y)∪{y}))∪{x} and ((A\(D(y)∪{y}))∪{x})∩D(z)=∅. z∉(A\(D(y)∪{y}))∪{x} 
⇒ (z≠x & z∈D(y)∪{y}). Since {x}∩D(y)={x}, ((A\(D(y)∪{y}))∪{x})∩D(z)=∅ 
⇒ z≠y. Consequently, z∈D(y) & (A\(D(y)∪{y}))∪{x}⊆A\D(z), there-
fore D(z)∪{z}⊆D(y) ⇔ zµy & D(z)⊆D(x). Consequently, if ∃y∈L(x): (A\
(D(y)∪{y}))∪{x} is not weakly stable then y is covered according to the third 
definition of covering. 
Suppose ∃y∈L(x): (A\(D(y)∪{y}))∪{x} is weakly stable. If y is uncovered 
then it is an uncovered alternative in L(x). If y is covered by some z, then 
D(z)∪{z}⊆D(y). By Lemma 5 ((A\(D(y)∪{y}))∪{x})∩D(z)≠∅, consequently 
x∈D(z), that is z∈L(x). If z is uncovered then it is an uncovered alternative in 
L(x). Suppose z is covered. Then D(z)∪{z}⊆D(y) ⇒ (A\(D(y)∪{y})∪{x}⊆(A\
(D(z)∪{z})∪{x}. According to Corollary of Lemma 5 (A\(D(z)∪{z})∪{x} is 
weakly stable. After substituting z for y and repeating the logical steps listed 
above, one obtains that any alternative that covers z must belong to L(x) as well. 
L(x) is finite, therefore, since relation of covering is asymmetric and transitive, 
there must be at least one uncovered alternative in L(x).
Therefore ∀y∈L(x) a set (A\(D(y)∪{y}))∪{x} is not weakly stable iff all 
alternatives in L(x) are covered, and ∃y∈L(x): (A\(D(y)∪{y}))∪{x} is weakly 
stable iff there is an uncovered alternative in L(x).
As a result, x belongs to a minimal stable set iff x is uncovered (according 
to the third definition of covering) or some alternative from the lower contour 
of x is uncovered (according to the third definition of covering). 
corollary to theorem 1a. Proof: UCIII⊆MWSII directly follows from the 
proposition of the Theorem. MWSII⊆UCp follows from the proposition of the 
Theorem, definition of UCp and UCIII⊆UCIV. 
lemma 6. Proof: 
In tournaments UCI=UCII=UCIII=UCIV=UCV⊆MWSI (Corollary to 
Theorem 1), while MWS
I⊂UCI, MWSI⊂UCII, MWSI⊂UCIII, MWSI⊂UCIV, 
MWSI⊂UCV (Example 1) are also possible.
It is possible that MWSI\MWSII≠∅ & MWSII\MWSI≠∅ (Example 7).
In tournaments MWSI⊆MU=MD (Lemma 4), while MU⊂MWSI (Exam-
ple 7) is also possible.
Let’s prove MWSI⊆UCp. Suppose alternative x belongs to a minimal weakly 
stable (according to the first definition) set B, x∈B. Then B\{x} is not weakly 
stable. Consequently, ∃y∉B\{x}: (B\{x})⊆(L(y)∪H(y)) & (B\{x})∩L(y)≠∅. 
1) Suppose y=x. Then ∀z: zµx ⇒ z∉B. Since B is a weakly stable set, ∀z: zµx 
⇒ ∃w∈B: wµz. (w∈B & wµz) ⇒ w≠x ⇒ w∈B\{x} ⇒ w∈L(x)∪H(x). Conse-
quently if y=x , then ∀z: zµx ⇒ ∃w: (xµw & wµz) or (xτw & wµz), i.e. x∈UCIII. 
Therefore, if x is uncovered according to the third definition of covering, x∉UCIII, 
and B is a weakly stable (according to the first definition) set then y≠x.
2) Suppose y≠x. Suppose x is not covered according to the second defini-
tion of covering, x∉UCII. Since B is a weakly stable set and (B\{x})∩L(y)≠∅ 
there must be an alternative w, w∈B: wµy ⇔ w∈D(x). (B\{x})⊆(L(y)∪H(y)) 
⇒ w=x ⇔ y∈L(x). (xµy & x∉UCII) ⇒ ∃z: zµx & zµy. (zµx & zµy & (B\
{x})⊆(L(y)∪H(y))) ⇒ z∉Β. Since B is a weakly stable set, zµx and z∉B imply 
there must be v, v∈B\{x}: vµz. ((∃v∈B\{x}: vµz) & (B\{x})⊆(L(y)∪H(y))) ⇔ 
(L(y)∪H(y))∩D(z)≠∅ ⇔ y is not covered by z according to the third defini-
tion of covering, y∈UCIII.
Therefore, if there is an alternative z, which 1) covers an alternative x accord-
ing to the fourth definition of covering (i.e. according to the second and third 
definitions simultaneously) and 2) also covers all alternatives from the lower 
contour set of x according to the third definition of covering then x does not 
belong to any minimal weakly stable set. Thus MWSI⊆UCp. ∃µ: MWSI⊂UCp 
is proved by Example 7.
Let’s prove MWSI⊆UT. Suppose alternative x belongs to a minimal weak-
ly stable (according to the first definition) set B, x∈B. Suppose not all alter-
natives in B are reachable from x. Let C denote a set of all those alternatives 
in B, which are not reachable from x. By supposition C⊂B & C≠∅. If y∈C 
& z∈B\C then either yµz or yτz, otherwise there would be a path from x to y 
through z. Therefore if ∀y∈C ∃w: wµy then w∉B\С. Suppose ∃w, y, w∈A\B, 
y∈C: wµy. Since B is a weakly stable (according to the first definition) set then 
∃z, z∈B: zµw. z∉B\С, otherwise there would be a path from x to y through z 
and w, consequently z∈C. Therefore, since none of the alternatives from B\C 
dominates any alternative in C, (∃w, y, w∈A\C, y∈C: wµy) ⇒ (∃z, z∈C: zµw). 
Therefore С is a weakly stable set according to the first definition. Since C⊂B, 
B is not a minimal weakly stable set, a contradiction. Therefore C=∅ and any 
alternative in a minimal weakly stable set MWSI is reachable from any over al-
ternative from this set. Suppose x belongs to a minimal weakly stable (accord-
ing to the first definition) set B, x∈B, and y dominates x, yµx. If y∈B then y is 
reachable from x. If y∉B then, since B is a weakly stable set, ∃z∈B: zµy. Since 
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z∈B, z is reachable from x, consequently, y is reachable from x trough z. Thus 
if an alternative x belongs to a minimal weakly stable set MWSI, any alternative, 
which dominates x, is reachable from x, i.e. x is untrapped. ∃µ: MWSI⊂UT is 
proved by Example 7.
In tournaments UCII=UCIV=UCV⊆MWSII⊆MU=UT, while MU⊂MWSII; 
UT⊂MWSII (Example 1) and MWSII⊂UCII, MWSII⊂UCIV, MWSII⊂UCV (Ex-
ample 2) are also possible. 
UCI⊆UCIII & UCIII⊆MWSII (Corollary to Theorem 1a) ⇒ UCI⊆MWSII. 
MWSII⊆UCp & UCp⊆MD ⇒ MWSII⊆MD. 
lemma 7. If x is k-stable and y is (k+n)-stable, n: n≥2, then x dominates y, 
x∈SP(k) & y∈SP(k+n), n: n≥2, ⇒ xµy.
Proof: If x is k-stable, each alternative in A is reachable from x in no more 
than k steps. Suppose yµx, then each alternative in A is reachable from y in 
no more than k+1 steps through x, therefore the degree of stability of y is no 
greater than k+1, a contradiction. 
theorem 2. Proof: If m=2 then the proposition is evident.
If m>2 then by induction.
1) If m=maxx∈MDlmax(x) then SP(m)≠∅. 
2) Suppose SP(i+1) is nonempty, let’s prove SP(i), i≥3 is nonempty too, 
SP(i+1)≠∅ ⇒ SP(i)≠∅, i≥3.
Let S=SP(m)+ … +SP(i+1), then MD\S=SP(1)+SP(2)+…+SP(i). If an alterna-
tive belongs to MD\S, its degree of stability is no greater than i, if it belongs to 
S — no less than i+1. 
SP(2) is nonempty as it is the uncovered set, SP(2)≠∅. By supposition 
SP(i+1)≠∅. Therefore both S and MD\S are nonempty proper subsets of MD, 
S⊂MD, MD\S⊂MD. 
Since MD is a minimal dominant set, ∃x, y, x∈S, y∈MD\S: xµy. Had it 
been otherwise all alternatives from MD\S would have dominated all alterna-
tives from S, which would have meant MD\S is a dominant set, and, respec-
tively, MD is not a minimal one. 
The degree of stability of y is no greater than i, the degree of stability of x is 
no less than i+1. According to Lemma 7, xµy ⇒ x∈SP(i+1) & y∈SP(i), therefore 
SP(i)≠∅. The induction stops when it comes to i=3. 
theorem 3. Proof: 1) P(2)=UC⊆MWS=S(1)⊆UCp=P(3) is a proposition of 
the Corollary to Theorem 1. Example 4 proves that ∃µ: P(2)⊂S(1)⊂P(3).
2) Suppose x is k-stable, x∈SP(k). There is always a minimal k-stable set B, 
which consists of only one alternative — x, B={x}. Therefore, if x belongs to 
P(k)=SP(2)+…+SP(k) then it must belong to S(k)=SS(1)+SS(2)+…+SS(k) as well, 
which implies P(k)⊆S(k) and x∈SP(k) ⇒ x∈SS(i), i≤k.
Suppose x belongs to a minimal k-stable set B, k>1. Since B is k-stable, it 
is always possible to reach any alternative outside B from some alternative in 
B in no more than k steps. 
If all alternatives in B\{x} are dominated by x, it is possible to reach any al-
ternative in B from x in 1 step. Therefore it is possible to reach from x any other 
alternative in no more k+1 steps, i.e. x∈P(k+1), which implies x∈P(k+2). 
Suppose ∃y∈B: yµx. Since B is minimal, then B\{x} is not k-stable, which 
implies that there is z outside B\{x}, not reachable from any alternative from 
B\{x} (y included) in less than k+1 steps. ∀w∈B\{x} ⇒ zµw ⇒ z≠x, since by 
supposition ∃y∈B: yµx. z is reachable from x in no less than k steps, otherwise 
there would be a path from y to z through x of length less than k+1. But since 
B is a k-stable set, there must be an alternative in B, from which z is reachable 
in no more than k steps. Since it can't be any alternative from B\{x}, it must be 
x. Therefore z is reachable from x in exactly k steps. Let x→z1→z2→…→zk-1→z 
be a path of length k from x to z. The second alternative in the sequence z1 must 
dominate y: z1µy, otherwise there would be a path y→z1→z2→…→zk-1→z from 
y to z of length k, i.e. of length less than k+1. xµz1 & z1µy & yµx ⇒ y is reach-
able from x in 2 steps. Thus any alternative in B\{x} is either dominated by x or 
reachable from x in 2 steps. Consequently, since B is k-stable, any alternative 
in A is reachable from x in no more than k+2 steps, i.e. x∈P(k+2). 
Thus x∈S(k) ⇒ x∈P(k+2), which implies S(k)⊆P(k+2). 
corollary 2. Proof: x∈SS(2) ⇒ x∈S(2) ⇒ x∈P(4)=SP(2)+SP(3)+SP(4) ⇒ ∀k: 
k=2 or k>4 x∉SP(k). x∉SP(2) because x∈SP(2) ⇒ x∈SS(1) (according to Theo-
rem 3).
corollary 3. Proof: x∈SS(k) ⇒ x∉S(k-1) ⇒ x∉P(k-1)=SP(2)+…+SP(k-1) ⇒ ∀i: i<k 
x∉SP(i). x∈SS(k) ⇒ x∈S(k) ⇒ x∈P(k+2)=SP(2)+…+SP(k+2) ⇒ ∀i: i>k+2 x∉SP(i).
lemma 8. Proof: By induction.
xµy1 ⇒ y1∈L(x)
Suppose ∀j: j≤i-1 yj∈Lj(x). Suppose ∃z∈Lj(x): zµyi for all j: 0≤j<i-1. Since 
z∈Lj(x), there must be a path from x to z: x→z1→z2→…→zj-1→z: zm∈Lm(x) for 
all m: m≤j-1. The length of this path is j, 0≤j<i-1. Since zµyi, there is a path from 
x to y x→z1→z2→…→zj-1→z→yi→yi+1→…→yk-1→y. The length of this path is 
j+(k-(i-1))=k+(j-(i-1))<k, i.e. this path is shorter than the path x→y1→y2→…
→yk-2→yk-1→y, a contradiction. Therefore ∀z∈Lj(x), ∀j: 0≤j<i-1 ⇒ yiµz. Ac-
cording to the definition of Lj(x) yi∉Lj(x) for all j: 1≤j<i. At the same time 
∃yi-1∈Li-1(x): yi-1µyi. According to the same definition yi∈Li(x). 
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